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Introduction 
The supposition behind this paper is that what I shall call “autonomous learning”—by which 
I mean the ability to think for oneself—is central to the idea of higher education. In one sense 
such a supposition is, I believe, uncontroversial. As evidence consider the claim, still 
regarded as important, that a university is, and should always be, a place of freedom of 
thought and speech. A more telling example, more telling because it testifies not only to the 
centrality of the notion of autonomous learning to the idea of higher education, but also to the 
practical contradictions within which this idea is caught, is provided by the current fate of 
philosophy within the academy. In contrast to most other traditional academic disciplines 
philosophy, as its name indicates, lacks a distinct subject matter, a realm or region of entities 
that it studies. Whilst the physicist studies nature or phusis, and the biologist speaks of bios, 
or life, the philosopher is simply the lover of wisdom. In an age when the connection between 
university education, employability, and the creation of wealth has become increasingly 
important, one would imagine that a discipline which lacking any distinct domain lacks any 
direct application to the world would be increasingly vulnerable. Certainly, philosophy no 
longer occupies the privileged place within the University that it did when it was regarded as 
the “Queen of the Sciences”; without doubt it is no longer identical with the academy as once 
it was; and there have been some notable recent attempts to close philosophy departments 
within this country. Yet, post-Dearing, the authors of the Subject Benchmark Statement for 
Philosophy still felt themselves able to affirm that “philosophy ought to be at the heart of the 
work of any university worthy of its name”,2 and that because philosophy essentially 
embodies precisely that disposition to critical self-examination which is integral to 
autonomous learning.  
Beyond the widely shared assumption that the capacity to think, learn and behave 
autonomously is central to the aims and ideals of Higher Education, however, there is a 
greater degree of controversy. Some regard that capacity as “an outcome for students in 
higher education”;3 for others it is a more or less necessary pre-requisite for entry to higher 
education; for yet others it is a pre-requisite capacity, possessed in germ by the student, and 
progressively developed throughout the course of their studies by its actualisation. And if it is 
accepted that such a capacity is developed by higher education, forming a more or less 
explicit outcome for students, then there is disagreement over how it is best developed.  
The claim that I wish to advance in the first part of this paper is that autonomous learning 
is a disposition, habitually acquired. Since habitual activities are often regarded as 
thoughtless and unintelligent—activities that are mindlessly repeated—such a claim might 
seem, at best, paradoxical. However, once it is accepted that habits are not necessarily 
unintelligent, there are good grounds to understand autonomous learning in such a way. 
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Having presented my reasons for this claim, I should like then in the second part of the paper 
to present for discussion its implications. Some of those implications bear on how we think 
about teaching as a practise, but perhaps the most important—at least what I see as the most 
important—relates to what we think the function or purpose of education itself is.  
 
 
Part I: The Habit of Learning 
1.1. What is Autonomous Learning? 
In one respect at least, the definition of autonomous learning is uncontroversial: it is the 
exercise of the capacity to think for oneself. Just as there is little contention over the minimal 
definition of what autonomous learning is, there is little dispute over how it is recognised. It 
is generally accepted that the capacity for autonomous learning is recognised by its 
expression in a number of different forms, such as the ability to understand an argument and 
set it in context; to search for, read, and understand relevant primary and secondary material; 
to explain and articulate an issue in oral and written form to others; and to demonstrate an 
awareness of the consequences of what has been learned. 
However, the minimal definition of autonomous learning can support two different views 
about the issue. One view is that autonomous learning simply and solely constitutes learning 
that students do for themselves. For those that hold such a view, an autonomous learner is 
someone who given minimal information would, for example, go away to the library, find 
sources for themselves and work by themselves. In the discipline of philosophy such work 
would amount to the student sitting down with a text and trying to come to an understanding 
of it on their own. Another view, however, and one that significantly contradicts the first, has 
it that autonomous learning involves showing the student how to do something in such a way 
that they are then capable of undertaking a comparable activity by themselves (for example, 
having been shown how to analyse Descartes‟ works, they can then go off an analyse 
Hume‟s).  
Significantly, these different views about what autonomous learning is are related to 
differences in the way in which the practice of autonomous learning is seen to be developed 
or reinforced. Where it is held that autonomous learning essentially amounts to working on 
one‟s own, it follows that fostering autonomous learning simply involves telling students to 
go away and read secondary texts in order to find out what other people have found 
problematic about a particular issue or argument. Lectures, and thus the lecturer, fulfil an 
obvious function in such a model: they provide the student with minimal introductory 
information, and then send them away to exercise those skills that are the mark of the 
autonomous learner. Seminars are no less an important aspect of higher education on such a 
view, but the role of the seminar tutor becomes merely to provoke debate by asking students, 
„why do you think that?‟ On the other hand, according to the second understanding, 
autonomous learning is a capacity—or better, a disposition—instilled through practice and 
exemplification: giving the students a model to copy, showing them how to break down and 
analyse an argument, how to structure an essay, and seeking to inspire them as a role model. 
On this view, autonomous learning is the exercise of skills, developed and perfected through 
continuous practice, which come to be second nature. It is, in short, a disposition inculcated 
through habit. Or, to put it another way, it is a habitual disposition. 
 
1.2. What is habit?  
Is there not something paradoxical, even downright wrong, in linking autonomy of learning—
the free, unforced, self-reflective exercise of thought—with habit, insofar as habit, construed 
as the impulsion to continue to behave in the same way, and thus with a sort of mechanical 
uniformity, is supposed to involve an absence of thought and attention? However, such an 
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understanding of habit, to say nothing of thought, is itself one that is itself an habitual 
acquisition, the legacy of the abstractive opposition of mind and body, freedom and necessity, 
activity and passivity, which is characteristic of Enlightenment philosophy and thought. On 
this view, habit is essentially corrupting, since through the operation of habit an act or action 
repeated reduces the active to the passive, the thoughtful to the thoughtless.  
Without wishing to repeat here the philosophical critique of Enlightenment thought—a 
critique that stretches from Nietzsche through phenomenology to Derrida and beyond—it will 
suffice to say that much, if not all, post-modern philosophy (I use the term in its non-
technical sense) refuses modern metaphysics‟ restrictive identification of intelligence with 
self-conscious reflection, and freedom with the mental faculty of volition. Action and 
perception, and not merely contemplation and intellection, are granted an intelligence of their 
own. This rejection of the prejudices of modern philosophy makes possible an understanding 
of habit that is closer to that of Aristotle, for whom habit, ethos, is the means by which the 
rational and appetitive part of the soul is directed, that is, educated.
4
  
I cannot hope to offer the detailed account or argument that would properly serve to 
establish these points. Instead, I would like to appeal to an example given by the 20
th
 century 
French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who did so much to rehabilitate the status 
of both perception and the body. The example—or better the description—taken from the 
Phenomenology of Perception is that of a blind person‟s use of a cane, and it will, I hope, 
suffice to support the claims I have just made about action, perception and habit.  
Merleau-Ponty argues that “the acquisition of a habit is [...] the grasping of a 
significance”,5 and he continues, through habit:  
 
The blind man‟s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for 
itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of 
touch, and providing a parallel to sight. In the exploration of things, the length of the stick 
does not enter expressly as a middle term: the blind man is rather aware of it through the 
position of objects than of the position of objects through it.
6
  
 
This description makes apparent what we might call the miracle of habit; for through habit 
the blind man‟s cane ceases to be an inert object. The prosthetic implement becomes an 
organ, that is it becomes part of the living body; it is invested with the perceptive intelligence 
of the body—that vital and attuned instrument of our being-in-the-world, which is endowed 
with that capacity for apprehension that the phenomenologists called intentionality, and 
which we can here call simply a directedness towards and comprehension of beings.  
Of course, it might be objected that this is simply a description of the work of habit at the 
level of the body and motility, and that at the level of consciousness habit is the great 
deadener. But to that objection my response would be that what Merleau-Ponty‟s description 
makes apparent is an intertwining of intelligence and the body, the body and intelligence, 
such that neither can be properly understood in abstraction from the other. Thus if habit is the 
means by which the body contracts a certain disposition, a certain way of being, it must be 
allowed that it goes all the way up, so to speak; that habit is, in truth, a power that shapes all 
human faculties, underlying the operations of the understanding and reason as much as those 
of the muscles and sinews.  
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1.3. Habit, Desire and Autonomous Learning 
It seems to me that arguing that autonomous learning is a habit of mind is important because 
it allows us to overcome those prejudices and assumptions that condition us to think of it as 
an innate ability, which some students have already realised, that others need only to be told 
about in order to exercise at will, and which still others have only a limited capacity to grasp.  
However, it could be objected that what I have said thus far amounts simply to applying a 
well established distinction between what we might call „telling that‟ and „showing how‟ 
methods of teaching to autonomous learning, according to which mere „telling that‟ without 
„showing how‟ is nothing more than issuing instructions without instructing, ordering rather 
than educating. It might also be objected that not only is not much gained by conceiving 
autonomous learning as an acquired habit, but there is a fundamental incoherence involved in 
doing so that obscures and confuses things, it being impossible to explain how repetition 
could instil in a student so vital a capacity as autonomous learning. At the very least, it might 
be said, the inculcation of the habit of autonomous learning cannot be achieved simply by 
repetition through practice. Rather, the repetition must itself be undertaken because the 
student desires to learn independently. In that case, does not conceiving autonomous learning 
as a habitually acquired disposition at best simply push the problem one stage back, since the 
student either has the desire to learn independently or does not? In answer to this, it is 
necessary to recognise that desires and habits are one in the sense that although they are 
conceptually distinguishable, they are existentially reciprocally dependent: desires inform and 
motivate habits, whilst habits generate, form, and deform desires. In other words, repetition 
becomes a habit in the sense that it shapes desire, whilst without the desire the habit will not 
stick, a point made by Aristotle.
7
  
Beyond this, however, it is important to acknowledge that how to stimulate this desire in 
students is a question to which there are no easy or absolute answers, for the capacity of a 
teacher to stimulate the desire to learn independently is not itself something that can be taught 
abstractly. Teaching is a practical art acting upon the moment, and not a theoretical science 
concerned with the universal, and it requires that the teacher applies his or her particular 
skills to specific circumstances. Consequently, the principles of teaching are only general 
truths, and this is something that shapes the points that I will go on to make. For the moment 
though, I want only to say that engendering autonomous learning is not a matter of producing 
the desire to learn independently ex nihilo. Although it might be the case that students are 
increasingly less equipped to learn autonomously when they first enrol at university, and 
whilst not all students who undertake a degree necessarily do so out of a desire to exercise 
independence of thought, the majority do. Certainly, this is not an original point
8—and in any 
case, it is a point that is scarcely worth contesting, since to do so would imply that there was 
no good reason to teach at university, or to be concerned with how we teach what we teach. 
If, as is sometimes said, students are nowadays prone to treat their tutors as repositories of 
information, whose job is to tell them what they need to know, that is perhaps because they 
have been habituated to treat teachers in such a way by their prior experience, and is not in 
itself an indication that they lack the desire to learn independently. Indeed, when asked, those 
students who came directly from A Levels to university often recognise that they have not 
been sufficiently accustomed to autonomous learning—a recognition that presupposes the 
desire to develop this disposition. 
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Part II: Teaching Techniques 
2.1. Introduction 
Thus far I have sought to advance a definite conception of what autonomous learning is: a 
habitual disposition, a habit of mind, expressed through a range of activities and skills, 
acquired and developed through practice. This is significant outcome not only for theoretical 
or philosophical reasons, but because it also provides a basis for understanding and 
responding to the challenge of instilling independence of learning in students in the current 
context of higher education.  
One of the things that is important about seeing autonomous learning as a habit of mind is 
that it overcomes the view that promoting autonomous learning entails leaving students to 
work by themselves. Defined as a habit of mind, autonomous learning is a virtue in the fullest 
sense of the word—it is both a power as well as an excellence. However, it cannot be 
classified as what Aristotle terms an intellectual virtue; that is, an excellence of intellection 
owing its inception and growth to instruction.
9
 Instead, it is closer in nature to what Aristotle 
calls a moral virtue; one that is neither engendered by nature nor contrary to nature, but 
which we are constituted by nature to receive, and which owes its full development to 
habituation.
10
  
Understood in this sense, the paradox of autonomous learning is the paradox of habit. A 
habit is not necessarily unintelligent—indeed it can be an expression of the highest 
intelligence—and yet for all that it is not exercised self-consciously or voluntarily. 
Autonomous learning—independent thinking—is the highest virtue of the mind, an 
expression of its freedom, and the necessary condition of all other intellectual virtues, and yet 
itself is an acquired disposition, a second nature, and therefore is neither voluntary nor 
involuntary.  
It follows then that autonomy of learning is not „teacherless learning‟. Teachers have a 
decisive role to play in inculcating this habit of mind. Certainly it is correct to claim that 
autonomous learning is “thinking for oneself”, but to reduce the definition solely to this claim 
risks obscuring the problem it involves, since it is precisely that expression that promotes the 
idea that all one has to do is encourage the isolation and separation of students as if that were 
equivalent to pedagogical self-reliance.  
 
2.2. Instructional Educational Objectives and Expressive Objectives 
The crucial question remains as to how best to inculcate the disposition of autonomous 
learning. As Aristotle observes, we acquire a virtue by exercising it
11—builders learn to build 
by building, swimmers learn to swim by swimming; similarly, students become autonomous 
learners through the activity of autonomous learning, and they perfect the exercise of this 
disposition through repetition and practice. In this way, autonomous learning becomes second 
nature. It follows from this that best practice, underpinned by a coherent encouragement of 
autonomous learning, is achieved by fostering good habits. In other words, if “like activities 
produce like dispositions”,12 then the virtue of autonomous learning is fostered by activities 
that have the requisite qualities. 
As I see it, this would entail moving from a knowing that to a knowing how based 
programme of learning; that is, a programme of learning founded on, or foregrounding, a set 
of practically based competencies, and at the same time moving away from thinking about 
and planning learning in terms of what the educationalist Elliott Eisner called “instructional 
objectives”, and instead recognising the need to think about curriculum activities in terms of 
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“expressive objectives”.13 Hopefully, what I go on to say will make clear why the former 
move also requires the latter, my argument being that without the latter, learning would risk 
being reduced to a merely mechanical acquisition of competencies.  
Let me begin by telling you about what Eisner calls “instructional objectives”. In a paper 
entitled „Instructional and Expressive Educational Objectives: Their Formulation and Use in 
Curriculum‟, Eisner argues that instructional objectives are those which are arrived at by 
breaking down learning into specifiable elements that can then, theoretically, be delivered in 
a systematic way with the aim that the student would come out of the course of study in a 
state of knowing; that is to say, they are should “specify unambiguously the particular 
behaviour (skill or item of knowledge) the student is to acquire after having completed one or 
more learning activities”.14  
In my experience, it is in these terms that most academics are required to think about and 
plan their courses. Properly identified and formulated, and set out in intervals of time 
appropriate for the students who to acquire them, these objectives are invested with an 
unimpeachable authority. For they provide the criteria by which the curriculum-maker selects 
content and identifies the appropriate learning activities and the means by which to test them. 
Once these objectives have been defined, what content is to be taught, which teaching 
procedures are to be adopted, which assessment activities used and what criteria to use in 
grading assessments all follow necessarily. 
Eisner articulates a number of criticisms of instructional-type objectives. For example, 
noting that their authority rests on their supposed pedagogic utility he echoes one of 
Aristotle‟s criticisms of Plato‟s account of the idea of goodness. Just as Aristotle argues that 
it is clearly absurd to suppose that craftsmen—all of whom aim at a particular good specific 
to their profession—would abstain from theoretical enquiry into the idea of the good if such 
knowledge were itself really as potent in practice as Plato assumed it to be,
15
 so too Eisner 
rhetorically asks: “why is it that teachers do not eagerly use tools that would make their lives 
easier?”16 Or, is it perhaps he asks, “that the power and utility assigned to objectives [...] are 
somewhat exaggerated?”17 Or, floating another possibility—to which I will return—is it the 
case, he asks, that the basic supposition of such an approach to education just do not accord 
with some teachers‟ basic assumptions about education and about people?  
Eisner opposes to “instructional objectives” what he calls “expressive objectives”. An 
expressive objective, he says:  
 
Does not specify the behaviour the student is to acquire after having engaged in one or 
more learning activities. An expressive objective describes an educational encounter: it 
identifies a situation in which [students] are to work, a problem with which they are to 
cope, a task they are to engage in—but it does not specify what from that encounter, 
situation, problem, or task they are to learn. An expressive objective provides both the 
teacher and the student with an invitation to explore, defer or focus on issues that are of 
peculiar interest or import to the enquirer. An expressive objective is evocative rather than 
prescriptive.
18
 
 
                                            
13
 See Eisner, E., “Instructional and Expressive Educational Objectives: Their Formulation and Use in 
Curriculum”, http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/37/e2/25.pdf 
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In short, expressive objectives are descriptions of situations in which students explore, try to 
understand, grasp the point of, feel the enthusiasm of other students in the group about what 
is going on. The point for Eisner is that the expressive objective cannot have its significance 
or value expressed in advance; its value emerges from the encounter with it.  
For Eisner, expressive objectives have the distinct advantages of being close to the 
practice of teachers, and of being specific to the situation and to the learner, thereby 
promoting an active engagement in learning. And for this reason it seems to me that such 
objectives would best serve to inculcate the habit of autonomous learning. But how might 
such a way of thinking about learning inform thinking about teaching? Or, to put this 
question another way, how might teaching practice best be facilitated according to this view 
of autonomous learning? It has been suggested to me that one way in which it might be 
facilitated would be by developing a Handbook of Practices.
19
 Rather than issuing to 
academics a set of “instructional objectives” or even a set of instructions about formulating 
“instructional objectives”, such a handbook would identify, develop and detail a series of 
practices appropriate to each stage of an educational programme, building specific 
competencies through regular practising.  
 
2.3 Education, episteme poietike and phronesis 
In this last, concluding section of my paper, I want to try to articulate a philosophical 
argument for my suggestion that Eisner‟s expressive objectives would best facilitate the 
inculcation of the habit of autonomous learning. To make this argument, and at the risk of 
repeating something that is well known to most of you, I should like to offer a summary of 
Eisner‟s brief history, or genealogy, of the evolution of the concept of “educational 
objectives” in the twentieth century. Doing so will, I hope, enable me to make clear what I 
think are the implications of my claims for the way in which we conceive the purpose or 
function of education per se.  
According to Eisner, at the beginning of that century, education, along with much else, 
became subject to the demands of efficiency and performativity. That is, it was subject to the 
same rationale as industrial processes, and was itself regarded in terms analogous to those 
processes. Eisner argues: 
 
Under pressure from local boards of education [...] school administrators tried to protect 
their positions and to reduce their vulnerability to public criticism by employing methods 
developed by Francis Taylor in industry in order to improve the efficiency of the school. If 
the school could be managed scientifically, if the procedures that had been employed so 
successfully in the production of steel could be used in schooling, education might become 
more efficient.
20
 
 
As Eisner notes, to effect this transformation it was necessary to establish quantitative and 
qualitative standards for judging the outcome of the educational process; time and motion 
studies needed to be made to identify the most efficient means of achieving the desired 
educational outcome; ideally, the educational process was not only to be standardised but 
routinised too, in the sense that as little as possible was left to the judgement of the individual 
“practioners”; and “the tasks to be undertaken were to be divided into manageable units so 
that they could be taught and evaluated at every step”.21  
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One might take issue with Eisner‟s account of the causes and motives that led to the 
subjection of education to the dictates of efficiency and performativity, and perhaps even to 
his historical dating of that process. For it seems to me that one could locate the very changes 
that Eisner identifies in education within the broader sphere of the historical formation of 
what Michel Foucault has called “disciplinary power”, that is, that series of specific 
techniques and technologies directed towards correcting and normalising behaviour through 
discipline and training which became historically decisive in Europe in the course of the 
nineteenth century.
22
  
Be that as it may, the important point to note is that the emergence of the concept of 
“educational objectives” and in particular “instructional-type” “educational objectives” is 
linked to a productivist conception of education. In this sense, instructional objectives are 
comparable to what Aristotle called episteme poietike—that knowledge or know-how that 
informs tekhne, making or production.
23
 What is significant in this regard about the 
knowledge or know-how that informs technical production is that, according to both Plato 
and Aristotle, it essentially takes the form of a pre-envisaging of a proto-type that then serves 
to guide the productive process itself. As Aristotle himself puts it: “things are generated 
through tekhne from the eidos in the soul”;24 that is to say, the producer—the potter, let‟s 
say—has in mind an image of the product to be produced—the cup or mug—itself envisaged 
according to the specific function the product is to serve, which image guides her hand in the 
fashioning of the material into the final form of the thing. Similarly, the educationalist has in 
mind an idea—an archetype, norm or standard—and the student is fashioned or formed by 
the process of education to that archetype, norm or standard.  
For Aristotle, episteme poietike or tekhne, is a form of calculative deliberation.
25
 It is a 
thinking about things that are not by necessity but that can be otherwise, since as Aristotle 
says no-one deliberates about things that are invariable. However, there are, for Aristotle, two 
types of calculative or deliberative thinking, the second being what he calls phronesis, which 
is often translated as „prudence‟ and sometimes as „practical wisdom‟. Phronesis is a sort of 
circumspection or deliberative concern over one‟s own doings. Whereas tekhne is a 
productive know-how—a knowledge relating to making, phronesis is a practical wisdom—
that is concerned with acting.  
But why is it important to distinguish between tekhne and phronesis? To answer all too 
briefly, it is because, for Aristotle, the human is never a finished product or article, 
notwithstanding all talk to the contrary. This not-being is not a deficiency, but is rather the 
distinctive virtue of the human being. The product is a determinate entity: it is conceived and 
created in accordance with a fixed end, and its being is exhausted by that end. By contrast, 
the human is an indeterminate being—a point that is captured by the Aristotelian notion of 
praxis or acting as opposed to making: in praxis or acting, the end lies in the acting: the deed 
or action is its own end. In deliberating about acting the deliberator deliberates about him or 
herself. This deliberation is not originally or primarily a decision made by a reflective 
subject; it is not an explicit, reflective and judgmental consideration about what to do, but a 
deliberation that is first of all enacted. In acting we fulfil, or at least encounter the possibility 
of fulfilling, our highest potentiality.  
All that in order to suggest that conceiving of education in terms of “instructional 
objectives”, which are, I think, objectives appropriate to, or conceived according to a process 
of making, is ultimately unsustainable. Clearly, in view of what I have already said, it cannot 
be claimed that the human being cannot be thought of as a product, and that education cannot 
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be conceived of as a process of production. Not only do the accounts of Eisner and Foucault 
testify to the possibility of so conceiving the human being, but Christian metaphysics itself 
thought the human as a creature, the product or creation of God. Nor is it the case that I am 
forecasting the destruction of educational institutions—universities will, I think, continue to 
exist, although in what form is a different question. Rather, the point is that the consequence 
of such a conception forces such a distortion of education that eventually it becomes untrue to 
itself—that is, it ceases to be that process that leads the human being to its humanity, and thus 
to the fulfilment of its essence or arête, its specific virtue.  
By contrast, to think of autonomous learning as a habit that can be inculcated in 
accordance with what Eisner terms “expressive objectives” is to think about education as 
open-ended process in which student and tutor are exposed to a series of encounters, in which 
the activity and not the outcome is paramount. In this sense, it is true, or truer, I think to the 
original vocation of education—which is not to fit the individual to a specific function, but to 
allow them to become what they are—a free and active being. In other words, it is true to the 
notion of autonomous learning.  
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